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Editorial Comment
THE UNITED STATES-A UNION OR A UNITY
We, the people of the United States in order to form
a more perfect union... do ...

establish this Constitution

for the United States of America.-Preamble to the Constitution.
The Constitution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible union of indestructible states.-C. J. Clase in
Texas v. White, 7 Wall, 724.
There is before the House of Representatives at the
present time a measure known as the Porter bill which in
terms provides for the establishment of a bureau or commission for the regulation and control of narcotics. The bill
has aroused much adverse criticism especially among physicians. This criticism has assumed two general forms: First,
it is argued that the present Harrison act has proved quite
satisfactory and that the further regulation of narcotics by
the new act is entirely unnecessary; secondly, the power of
the government to pass such a law is questioned, it being
contended that it would involve a serious invasion of the
power of regulation which inheres in the state.
It may at first blush appear reactionary to question
the power of the Federal Government to pass such regulations as the Harrison act and the Porter measure. The
course of legislation of Congress during the last half century certainly sustains this view. But it is well at times to
pause in the headlong rush of the present toward the future
and look back in retrospect into the past to obtain some
indication of trends and tendencies; to view our future
through the eyes of the past.
With this in mind we may view the attitude of mind
with which the Supreme Court has dealt with the most
fundamental of constitutional questions.
In 1803 the power of the Supreme Court to review

Congressional legislation was determined in a lucid and
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logical opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall. Marbury
v. Madison, Cranch. 137. Sixteen years later, the Supreme
Court had occasion to pass upon an act of Congress which
had established a federal bank. Now there had been no
power expressly granted to Congress to establish a bank;
but, the court; again through the mouth of Marshall, upheld
the act as constitutional under the "necessary and proper"
clause. McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wash 316. The decision standing alone was right and proper, although it came
as quite a shock to Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans; but it bespoke a tendency; the issue of liberal or strict
construction had been resolved in favor of liberalism. The
foundation had now been laid for a wholesale invasion of
the rights of the several states which had been received to
them under Tenth Amendment, and the invasion was not
long in coming, and it came through the aperture of the
taxing power. A congressional act was passed imposing a
tax upon bank notes issued by state banks, and the rate of
which was so high as to drive those notes out of existence.
This act was upheld by the Supreme Court in an opinion
which created a further potential source of the invasion of
state rights; for the court laid down the principle that when
Congress acts within the limits of its Constitutional authority, it is not within the province of the judicial branch of
the government to question its motives. Veajie Bank v.
Fenso, 8 Wall 533. That principle was far reaching; it
would justify the invasion of the police power of the state
under the guise of taxation or any other specific grant of
power. Nor was Congress unappreciative of its prolific
authority, for forthwith it passed an act imposing upon colored oleomargarine a tax which was clearly prohibitive. The
Court, not receding from the principle of the Feno case,
supra, had no hesitancy in sustaining the tax by a 6 to 3
decision. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27. The court
in rendering this decision was either unaware or felt itself
unaffected by the dictum of Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat 1, that "Congress is not empowered to tax for those
purposes which are within the exclusive province of the
states." Great strides had been taken now in the building
up of a national unity-a usurpation of the reserved police
power of the states. Was there to be a limit? The answer
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was the decision of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U. S. 20, where an act of Congress purporting to be an
excise tax was held invalid as interfering with the police
power of the states. The act was one requiring an exaction
from all persons. employing children under the prescribed
ages, and the court held this to be in a nature of a penalty
rather than as an excise, and so held -that as the Act on
its face bears testimony of its own invalidity it could not
be upheld. The very ingenious distinction was made between this case and the Fenno v. McCray case on the ground
that the tax law involved in those cases did not show their
invalidity on their face, and therefore they were presumed
valid. The distinction is well drawn, but the decision may
lose its force in future if the centripetal spirit continues to
move the Court.
But the rights of the state are not prejudiced by the
taxing power alone; the power to regulate commerce between the states has gone even further in unifying the union
and in reducing the reserved power of the states to a shadow
of their former sovereignty. These seemingly innocuous
words "the power to regulate commerce" have been construed so liberally as to bestow upon Congress, under that
provision, the authority to regulate almost everything conceivable related to interstate commerce. Under this power
there has been building a Federal police power, rivalling
in its extent that of the very states from which it has, by
degrees, built up. The first act of this nature was passed
in 1895 when Congress enacted a law forbidding the interstate shipment of lottery tickets. The act was held valid
by the Supreme Court in the so-called Lottery Cases, 188
U. S. 321. The decision was five to four. The contention
that admitting that Congress had the power to prohibit the
carriage in interstate commerce, Congress could regulate
any article so sent, the court dismissed with "it will be time
enough to consider the constitutionality of such legislation
when we must do so. The dissenting justices faces all the
consequences of the decision for they declared that "the
necessary consequence [of the decision] is to take from the
states all jurisdiction over the subject so far as interstate
commerce was concerned." Congress here also sensed with
keen delight its untold power. *The Lottery Act was fol-
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lowed in rapid succession by the Pure Food and Drug Act,
the Mann White Slave Act, the Harrison Narcotics Law,
and the proposed Potter bill. All of the acts and laws mentioned have been sustained as valid by the Supreme Court.
The stream of this type of legislation had become a raging
cataract, and the question arose here as it did under the
taxing power: Will there be a limit? Strangely enough,
child labor stemmed the tide here as it did in the taxing
power, the Supreme Court holding such legislation invalid
as an interference with the right of the state. Hammer v.
Dagenhart,247 U. S. 251. The distinction drawn between
this act and those mentioned before was that in the former
class the regulation extended only to an article of commerce
while here the regulation was of that which preceded the
interstate shipment, and the regulation was therefore not
proper. So for a time, at least, the encroachment upon federal territory has been delayed so far as the interstate commerce power is concerned.
We come now to a third manner in which the federal
unity is made possible: that is under the treaty making
power. The Constitution provides, it will be recalled, that
treaties are made by the President with the concurrence of
two-thirds of a quorum of the senators. There is a further
provision relating to what constitutes the law of the land,
Art. VI, See. 2; it is as follows: "This Constitution, and
the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made ... under 'authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."
In the case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 in which
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, passed pursuant to a treaty
with Canada for the purpose of preserving our birds, was
sustained, Mr. Justice Holmes in delivering the opinion
pointed out the difference between the foregoing provisions
of Act VI and concluded that by that provision no restriction was imposed by the Constitution upon the trea '-making power, that the act passed pursuant to the treaty was
not forbidden by an "invincible radiation from the general
terms of the Tenth Amendment"; he admitted that there
may be "qualifications of the treaty-making power, but they
must be ascertained in a different way." Then comes a sentence which casts an ominous cloud over state sovereignty:
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"... . there may be matters of the-sharper exigency for the
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it
is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government' is not to be found."
Now the whole tendency of the opinion is to further limit
and diminish the effect of the Tenth Amendment. What requires national action, who determines the question, whether
the treaty-making power is limited to matters requiring
national action-these questions are not touched upon. The
generality of the opinion is typical of Supreme Court pronouncements-but it must be said, on the other hand, in
all fairness, that no greater delineation of the subject was
called for than that presented.
At any rate the decision presents a third direct method
which may be productive of state invasion.
But there has been no criticism on the part of the
people; no great voice raised in protest against this wholesale usurpation. Docility and apathy on the part of the
people have marked the progress of the unifying movement.
Economic and social activities have been too all-pervading
to allow the individual to give more than a fleeting thought
to the political factor.
There has perhaps been more than apathy. Due to
ignorance of fundamental principles the average citizens
have not only permitted but even been actually responsible
for increasing the strength of the federal government
and bringing about a further stage of weakness in the state
government. This he has done in two ways: 1, Constitutional Amendment; 2, Federal subsidies to states.
Constitutional amendments which lapped off huge portions of state soveignty began after the Civil War. Before
the passage of these amendments there were relatively few
restrictions placed upon the state. Perhaps the amendments
were beneficial, they may have even been necessary, but they
help to make state legislatures feel the overpowering mastery of the Supreme Court, and their own subordinate
position.
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The eighteenth and nineteenth amendments further
operated to diminish the power of the states. The eighteenth
operated to further extend the federal police power which
had been developed under the Commerce clause. The nineteenth tolled from the state the power to determine who
may or who may not vote to a further extent than was done
by the fifteenth.
The amendments being the exercise of the sovereignty
of the people no more need be said of them than that they
indicate the will of that people that the nation shall be a
unified whole.
Of the national subsidies-the method of the federal
goverr.-nent in aiding state projects by matching the state
government dollar for dollar-their effect on the centralized
integration by way of increased state dependency is so obvious that with that effect noted, they may be passed over.
The ultimate decision rests with the "people" who, in
theory, are sovereign. They must determine whether our
dual system of government, established by the Constitution,
is a feasable, workable system or whether it is the product
of an ancient time and should be discarded. It is readily apparent that the present drift toward a centralized system is
contrary to the principle of the dual system, and demands
that the will of the people be consulted on the question:
Shall we continue as "an indestructible union of indestructible states" or shall we be integrated into a national unity?
If the decision is in favor of the latter, then must our Consituation be scrapped as archaic and obsolete for the condition upon which it rests-the basic principle of states'
-R. B. Y.
rights-will have ceased to exist.

